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Summary  
Shortages of rigs and personnel have encouraged creativity in designing incentive contracts in the 
drilling sector. In particular for oil service contracts, since those companies have the most direct 
control of drilling efficiency. A large variety of contract types are in use, including within the 
individual oil company. This article describes and analyses the compensation formats utilised in 
oil service contracts. Changes in contract format pose a number of relevant questions relating to 
resource management, and the article takes an in-depth look at some of these. Do new incentive 
elements for drilling promote effective utilisation of scarce rig capacity at an aggregate level, or do 
they primarily represent a zero-sum game? How will a stronger focus on efficiency influence 
reservoir utilisation? How do the new compensation formats influence the development of costs in 
the industry?    
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Oil operations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) - as in other petroleum provinces - are 
characterised today by a shortage of rigs and very high rates. In addition, a disturbing decline in 
drilling efficiency can be observed. When rigs are scarce, utilising rig time as efficiently as 
possible becomes particularly important. This has prompted the use of incentive mechanisms in oil 
service contracts. It has been argued that incentives in the drilling sector are unbalanced in that 
contractors have been rewarded for uptime but hardly at all for efficiency. The companies and the 
authorities basically share a common interest in the best possible utilisation of scarce drilling 
capacity. Losing resources which could otherwise have been profitably produced because of rig 
capacity shortages and reduced drilling efficiency is also a matter of concern from a socio-
economic perspective. A number of resources are time-critical in that their recovery depends on 
the use of existing infrastructure, and irreversible losses may be incurred. But the authorities - who 
take a rather different (more long-term) view of the trade-off between current and future 
production - are perhaps also more open to the counterargument that drilling fast is less important 
than drilling correctly, and that incentives tied to drilling speed can reduce reservoir drainage and 
thereby resource utilisation. Challenges related to health, safety and the environment (HSE) can 
also arise. Another source of concern is that additional incentives can have the effect of driving up 
costs on top of already high rates. The question is whether new incentives will primarily encourage 
a reallocation of the best equipment and expertise.  
The focus in the article is on the relationship between contract design and drilling efficiency, 
primarily on mobile units. In this article we address oil service contracts. Rig contracts are 
analysed in Osmundsen et al (2008). For a discussion of the relationship between HSE and 
incentive systems in drilling, see Osmundsen et al (2006).  
A key element in our work on rigs and drilling has been the study of existing rig and oil 
service contracts on the NCS. The article also draws on a number of meetings and conversations 
with key specialists in oil companies, rig contractors and oil service enterprises.  
2. Rigs and drilling 
Rig hire and the cost of oil services are the dominant components in drilling expenses, as 
illustrated in Figure 1 by a representative well.   
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Figure 1. Typical composition of drilling costs. 
Source: data from rig contractors on the NCS.  
Drilling expenses have increased sharply in recent years. According to the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate (NPD), it cost the same to drill just 15 exploration wells in 2006 as 35 in 1997. Key 
causes of this rise include declining drilling efficiency and higher rig rates.  
 
Figure 2. Rig rates per day on the NCS. Source: ODS-Petrodata, North Sea Rig Report.   
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We can see from Figure 2 that rig rates have increased massively during recent years. Starting 
from less than USD 100 000 per day at the beginning of 2002, rig rates for high-spec semi rigs 
have now reached more than USD 400 000 per day. This reflects the oil industry boom sparked by 
the high price of crude, and the fact that few rigs were built over a fairly lengthy period.  
 
Figure 3. Drilling efficiency on the NCS, measured by the average number of metres drilled per 
day. Source: Sund (2007).   
Figure 3 shows that drilling efficiency, measured by metres drilled per day, has declined 
substantially since 2001 
 
from 102 metres per day to 80 metres at present. Given this very sharp 
fall in drilling efficiency, it is hardly surprising that various types of incentive contract have been 
tried out in this sector. But it can be added here that other measures might be better at identifying 
value creation in drilling. In addition to drilling speed, which affects the cost side, the amount of 
oil and gas which can be produced must be taken into account. This is not only a question of 
drilling fast, but also of drilling correctly. A trade-off may need to be made here, at least in parts of 
the well path.  
The causes of the decline in drilling efficiency (by conventional measures) have not been 
investigated in detail
2. One reason is that technological developments have made it possible to drill 
longer wells (including multilaterals) than before. Such wells are more demanding, but 
qualitatively better. Another reason is that remaining reserves are more complex and thereby more 
demanding to drill for. In view of these considerations, a decline in drilling efficiency is 
reasonable. New technology 
 
with a higher probability of downtime 
 
could also have contributed 
                    
 
2 Among other considerations, wells need to be divided into different types.  
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to a decline in drilling speed. Aging of the rig fleet might play a part, and maintenance may have 
been sub-optimal for various reasons, such as a focus on short-term accounting gain or very high 
capacity utilisation. Another reason is quite simply declining efficiency in drilling operations, 
which would be unfortunate. Very high capacity utilisation in terms of both equipment and 
personnel could be a key factor. When all hardware is in use, the average quality usually declines.   
3. Relevant literature  
This article builds on general contract and incentive theory. Good overviews are provided by 
Bolton and Dewatripoint (2005), Salanié (1998), Hillier (1997), Hart (1995), Laffont and Tirole 
(1993), and Milgrom and Roberts (1992). We also build on research which applies incentive 
theory to the petroleum sector. See Olsen and Osmundsen (2005), for example. A brief summary 
of the theory s recommendations for designing incentives is provided below. A number of these 
points and the problems they raise are considered in more detail later in the article.  
Incentive theory deals with a number of challenges faced when designing incentives: (a) 
asymmetric information 
 
the oil company normally knows less about the actual drilling 
operations than the contractors, but more than them about the reservoir; (b) renegotiation - 
opportunities to renegotiate weaken incentives in the original contract; (c) distortion of the activity 
- tying incentives to quantitatively measurable performance parameters could be at the expense of 
the qualitative performance dimension, which is more difficult to measure. Given these problems, 
it is perhaps unsurprising that empirical observations show that the introduction of incentives 
yields unintended consequences in a number of cases. It has also been shown that excessively 
complicated systems are frequently adopted. For such arrangements to work, it must be possible to 
understand, communicate and enforce them.  
Incentive agreements must be related to parameters which are (1) measurable, (2) observable 
by both parties, (3) within the contractor s sphere of control and (4) legally verifiable. This is not 
always possible. Measurement problems could be encountered with qualitative aspects such as 
quality and flexibility, for instance, and contractors often have more information than buyers - not 
least on what is attainable and the reasons for non-conformances.  
Concluding complete contracts is not normally feasible, since it is impossible to specify all 
outcomes in advance and since legal verification problems will arise. An incomplete contract is 
exposed to renegotiation, which weakens incentives and limits contract opportunities. Incentives in 
a single dimension lead to distortion. That can be at the expense of other work - typically, non-
measurable dimensions are given lower priority. Broad incentive schemes covering all key 
performance dimensions are accordingly required. This can mean complex contracts with 
substantial transaction costs. In some contexts, the optimum solution could therefore be to cover  
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non-measurable dimensions in another manner than incentives, for instance by regulations and 
control. An important criterion in all incentive design is the controllability principle
3. If they are to 
hit their target, incentives must be tied directly to conditions and quantities which the contractor 
can control. If the principle of controllability is not observed - in other words, if rewards are 
related to conditions outside the contractor s sphere of control - incentive systems can become 
akin to gambling. With risk-averse contractors, this will increase remuneration without improving 
performance and accordingly be sub-optimum from the buyer s perspective.  
Incentive theory can describe the conditions in which fixed-price (lump sum) or reimbursable 
(cost-plus) terms are suitable. Where incentives in drilling and oil service contracts are concerned, 
a difference exists between payment per metre drilled (unit rate) and per day (time rate). The first 
of these is closer to the fixed-price model and the second to reimbursable contracts. Fixed-price 
terms provide stronger cost incentives and a more predictable final bill. On the other hand, they 
can produce substantial conflicts over change orders and quality. Avoiding such disputes calls for 
the preparation of detailed drilling plans in advance. A fixed-price model is more likely to produce 
delays and involve a bureaucratic process when changes are required. In practice, this will often 
mean that the oil company must cede influence during the actual drilling operation.  
Reimbursable contracts provide weaker cost incentives and a more uncertain final price. But 
conflict will be reduced, and faster completion can also be achieved. It is easier for the operator to 
secure changes and influence the work process. This represents a trade-off from the oil company s 
perspective. Theory prescribes reimbursable contracts and incomplete plans when a low level of 
friction is required in renegotiations - in other words, when we have a complex project, an 
impatient oil company, and an oil company which wishes to exert influence during the work.  
The last of these considerations concerns important factors such as the company s strategic 
core. Who is to manage the drilling? The oil companies are under pressure here. They are meeting 
new competition from oil service and distribution companies (who integrate upstream), new 
international oil companies and well-capitalised national oil companies. The international oil 
companies are struggling to replace their reserves and are being hit to some degree by outsourcing, 
which they have pursued so extensively over many years that they can now visualise the prospect 
of meeting their contractors as competitors. In such conditions, they will seek to preserve their 
competitive advantages and to define their strategic core rather better. Drilling is quite literally at 
the centre of their core competence. The desire to control the drilling process will place constraints 
on the use of incentive deals. Turnkey contracts will not be applicable, for instance.  
We have recently at the NCS witnessed the introduction of contractual forms which lie 
between fixed-price and reimbursable types. Known as target cost contracts, these involve the 
parties sharing overruns and savings in relation to an agreed benchmark price. This permits a 
                    
 
3 Alternative terms which can be used are the influence principle or the sphere of control principle.  
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trade-off between risk sharing and incentives, as prescribed in incentive theory. Concern for 
optimum risk sharing - oil companies are normally better able to carry risk - is taken care of 
through asymmetric incentive design, where the upside is greater than the downside for 
contractors, and through an absolute floor on the downside. This type of contract is not much used 
internationally and receives little theoretical support
4. The reasons are that agreement is difficult to 
reach on benchmark size, and conflicts of interest arise when classifying changes. Theory 
accordingly concludes that reimbursable contracts are often preferable to target cost versions. 
However, it should be specified that research in this area has focused on fabrication contracts. One 
must be open to the possibility that other conclusions could be drawn in the drilling business, not 
least as a consequence of closer integration between oil company and contractor and a much 
shorter time frame for individual assignments.  
The number of companies operating in the drilling and oil service sector is small and capacity 
is limited. This normally means that the same contractor often has parallel contracts with several 
oil companies. Such constellations can be analysed with the aid of multi-principal agent theory. 
The oil companies compete here in several dimensions. Designing incentive contracts for 
contractors consequently comprises a game where account must be taken of the contract terms 
utilised by competing oil companies
5. Through the contract and tendering system, the oil 
companies seek to attract competent contractors at competitive rates and to achieve good quality 
and commitment within the framework of a contract. Incentives and bonus systems cannot simply 
just secure a higher commitment, but must in addition obtain a favourable allocation of personnel 
and hardware. Depending on how thorough the contracts are in specifying the quality dimension, 
the oil company with the highest incentive intensity in its contracts can emerge best from the 
allocation decisions made by the contractors
6. So incentive contracts are a question not only of 
efficiency, but to a great extent also of the allocation of input factors. This can influence the level 
of rates. Through negotiations with different oil companies over additional incentives after 
contracts have been signed, the contractors can also succeed in creating competition during its 
duration and thereby push up rates.  
Incentive contracts can serve as a selection mechanism, where contracts which reward 
efficient operation attract efficient companies since they are the ones with the most to gain from 
such an agreement. This type of game can mean that incentive elements in contracts may spread 
rapidly through an industry. A response is required if competitors introduce selection mechanisms 
in their contracts, or risk ending up with the least efficient contractors. 
                    
 
4 See Bajari and Tadelis (2001), for instance. 
5 A game also exists in relation to the partnership which takes over the rig when the contract expires. 
6 Either through conscious resource allocation between different contracts by contractor management, or through self-
selection by contractor employees. It has been reported that projects with bonus schemes attract result-oriented and 
competent employees within the contractor s organisation.  
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Moomjian (1999) finds that turnkey (total) contracts and ones which base remuneration on the 
number of metres drilled (footage remuneration) are seldom used in offshore drilling. The day rate 
contracts used are subject to bilateral negotiation and show little standardisation. This is the 
reverse of the position on land, where standard fixed-price contracts are frequently used. 
Moomjian also discusses important issues of principle related to insurance and risk sharing in 
drilling. He notes that risk sharing follows an incorrect and perverse pattern, where rig contractors 
can negotiate good terms for both rates and risk sharing in a sellers market and vice versa. This 
means that, when times are bad and contractors need low risk exposure, such exposure is typically 
high.  
From an incentive perspective, the individual economic player should be responsible as far as 
possible for the results they can influence themselves. This contrasts with insurance, which is 
precisely a matter of spreading risk thinly. Insurance and risk-sharing accordingly weaken 
incentives
7. Moomjian argues that a clear allocation of the responsibility of the parties must be 
made from an insurance perspective, regardless of fault. The parties will otherwise have problems 
calculating their risk exposure and will be forced in practice to insure the same risk, since the risk 
taken remains unclarified until after an incident has occurred. Rig contracts present a clear division 
of risk, in that the contractor bears the risk for its own personnel, rig and other hardware, while the 
oil company is responsible for its personnel and equipment, and in day-rate contracts also for well-
related risks such as pollution and damage to the well and reservoir.  
Corts (2000) describes the trade-off between turnkey and day-rate contracts. Turnkey 
contracts give the rig contractor stronger cost incentives and can cut drilling costs. But the oil 
company must draw up a time-consuming and expensive drilling specification in advance, and 
cedes in practice much of the flexibility in the drilling phase. Halfway through a drilling project, 
the oil company is locked in contractually with the drilling contractor. With a fixed-price model, 
this will typically result in expensive and difficult renegotiations. The division of labour will 
typically differ between the two types of contract. With day-rate contracts, the oil company will 
have a representative on the rig who takes decisions on the drilling operation in collaboration with 
the land organisation. Such decisions are delegated to the contractor in turnkey contracts. 
According to Corts, turnkey contracts are used solely in the Gulf of Mexico and only for roughly 
15 per cent of the wells. The limited utilisation of turnkey contracts for drilling is attributed by 
Corts in part to the multi-task problem - rewarding one measurable dimension (metres drilled per 
day) can be at the expense of other important and hard-to-measure quality indicators such as 
efficient reservoir drainage and information gathering. This problem with distortion of activities 
and focus is at its greatest for production wells, which accords with Corts  finding that turnkey 
contracts are most widespread in exploration drilling. Corts and Singh (2004) show that repeat 
                    
 
7 In practice, this is partly countered through the use of excess.  
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contracts between an oil company and a drilling contractor led increasingly to the abandonment of 
the turnkey model in favour of day rates. They explain this by the build-up of relationships and 
trust, which reduces the incentive problems and thereby the need for high incentive intensity.  
When such turnkey contracts emerged in the 1980s, many drilling contractors ran into 
financial difficulties when they discovered that they lacked expertise on the total management of 
drilling operations and the pricing of such services. However, a number of companies have 
subsequently built up the necessary expertise. Reasons why this type of contract has become 
established in the Gulf of Mexico are a liquid market for drilling services and a scale which 
reduces some of the problems with asymmetric information. One challenge for drilling contractors 
is the fear that oil companies are offering the riskiest and most difficult wells on turnkey contracts. 
In an empirical study, Corts (2000) shows that turnkey contracts are primarily used for exploration 
wells drilled by jack-ups in shallow water, and that oil companies utilising such contracts are small 
enterprises with limited experience and financial resources. Exploration wells in the North Sea 
should fit this description for some of the new companies on the NCS
8. However, establishing 
such contracts requires the presence of a drilling contractor willing to accept the enhanced risk.   
4. Oil services - evaluation criteria and compensation formats  
Contact theory distinguishes between the company awarding an assignment - the principal - and 
the company or person delivering a service - the agent. In our context, the agents are the various 
oil service companies. The principal is normally an oil licence, led by an operator. This is 
significant for optimum risk sharing in the contracts, since an oil company can spread its risk 
through the licence partnerships. Such risk sharing is normally more effective than would be 
possible for the contractors. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the principal in this article 
as the oil company.  
A detailed description is provided below of the compensation formats in the oil service sector, 
where substantial changes have taken place.  
4.1 Contract description for oil service provision  
Well-based contracts are the form most frequently used in exploration on the NCS - in other 
words, the licence retains the rig until drilling has been completed. Under long-term contracts, a 
                    
 
8 However, it is not uniformly the case that exploration wells are better suited to turnkey contracts - or more generally 
to incentive contracts - than production wells. The latter are more complex, but greater information is available about 
the sub-surface.  
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well once spudded is also completed. There are no cases of plugging before a job has been 
finished. This creates substantial planning problems in that the next licence does not know when it 
will get the rig. Should petroleum be discovered in the licence which the rig is due to leave, for 
instance, time will be required to test the well and the rig may be delayed at its next destination. 
Technical problems and downtime also occur regularly and irregularly. The contractor responsible 
will be penalised in such cases, but costs are far greater for the oil company in the form of lost 
progress and stand-by payments to all the other contractors who are waiting.  
In principle, a contractor due to move to another contract with higher rates will have an 
incentive to work excessively fast, but oil company representatives we have interviewed did not 
feel that was a problem in practice. It was checked by the drilling superintendent, and the 
contractor was also kept in line by all the other suppliers involved in a drilling operation. The 
contracts incorporated quality indicators (specifications) which were monitored along the way, and 
which could unleash penalties if non-conformities were discovered.  
The general remuneration format for oil service activities is payment per metre drilled when 
operations are under way and otherwise a stand-by rate. This differs from remuneration for rig 
hire, which is primarily based on day rates. A possible reason for the difference is that drilling 
involves significant variable costs (wear and tear), so that activity-related remuneration is more 
relevant here. Drilling contractors also exercise more direct influence over the pace of drilling 
(controllability principle). If the contractor suffers faults which cause downtime, deductions are 
made from remuneration (penalty, negative incentive). A typical well lasts for 40 days - in other 
words, it involves three-four offshore tours.  
Hydro introduced a performance-adjusted price system (Paps) as an incentive system for oil 
service activities some years ago. The new features of this contract are that penalties are 
supplemented by rewards for services performed well, and that penalties/rewards relate not to a 
complete well but to well sections. Benchmarks for drilling efficiency in each section are 
determined through a dialogue between oil company and service contractor. Meeting these 
benchmarks can give the contractor a substantial additional remuneration. The upside is greater 
than the downside (asymmetry), but both have a limit. We are talking, in other words, about a 
target cost contract - more specifically, a section-based, asymmetrical and stepwise linear 
remuneration per metre drilled, with a floor on the downside and a cap on the upside. General 
benchmarks are subject to an annual review, when ever more ambitious goals are set. If formation 
conditions fail to match expectations, or operational conditions change, the benchmarks can be 
modified along the way. This must be agreed in writing between the land organisations before 
work begins on the relevant drilling section.   
Viewed from an oil company perspective, the goal is not to drill as fast as possible but at the 
right speed. This speed is determined in this case on a section-by-section basis in dialogue with the  
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contractor. Bonuses are then tied to the specified target. Because drilling speed varies greatly from 
one section to another, section-based remuneration systems are required in order to provide precise 
incentives
9. Long drilling runs are also rewarded, which challenges the contractor s maintenance 
routines.  
Specialisation in the oil service sector means that each drilling operation is covered by a 
number of contracts. At times, for example, up to 40 different suppliers can be on the rig 
simultaneously. However, some of these companies have the same owner, which permits a certain 
amount of coordination (integrated contracts).  
The Paps contracts were concluded for the 2003-06 period, with extension options of three 
plus two years. This type of long-term contract is normal in the oil service business, and our 
experience is that the options are exercised almost without exception. Hydro has awarded such 
frame contracts to Schlumberger, Halliburton and Baker Hughes Inteq. The new bonus 
arrangements were not included in the original contract, but added later through formal 
amendments in dialogue with the suppliers. A couple of conditions should be noted here. Rig 
scarcity makes bonuses more important than usual. The contracts were awarded at old rates which 
are very favourable to the oil companies under today s conditions. The opposite will apply in other 
periods, however, and this can even itself out over time. Today s boom has nevertheless lasted a 
long time, and a sharply rising cost base combined with long-term contracts which provide rates 
with poorly targeted escalation clauses present contractors with major challenges. Frustration 
among contractors over big variances from spot terms has perhaps been somewhat tempered by 
these additional bonuses, and some of the motivation can accordingly be conditional on the state of 
the business cycle. Another reason why bonus schemes are likely to survive an economic 
downturn is that they are unbalanced. Contractors will only consent to share the upside while 
being protected against the downside.  
An important question is whether this type of incentive could have been part of the original 
invitation to tender. In today s conditions, the tender documentation opens for the possible 
introduction of incentives later in the contract period, but these are not specified so that the 
contractor can take account of them when calculating its bid. According to comments from 
contractors, it is hard to establish the necessary drilling benchmarks until experience has been 
secured with the relevant reservoirs. In other words, it will be difficult to design precise incentive 
systems which can provide a reasonable basis for the contractors to calculate their bids. With the 
possible introduction of additional incentives - to be regarded as a renegotiation of the 
compensation format
10 - it would be reasonable from the oil company s perspective under normal 
                    
 
9 While some of the sections are pure transport stages, where the focus is on speed and progress, others are in the 
reservoir with attention focused on quality and drainage. 
10 However, additional incentives can also be given unilaterally by the oil company.  
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conditions to require a reduction in the basic rates as compensation for possible additional 
incentives which provide too much upside (however, this would not be case with additional 
incentives which are reasonably balanced between upside and downside). But no such willingness 
appears to be present among the contractors. Once they have secured a long-term contract, they are 
in a very strong negotiating position over possible changes. Lack of balance in the renegotiations 
can explain the resistance to additional incentives shown by a number of oil companies. Variations 
in such unwillingness among these companies could rest on different contract philosophies, but 
may also reflect the fact that base rates can differ very greatly depending on when the contract was 
awarded. It may seem more reasonable to conclude an agreement on additional incentives with 
substantial upside if the base rate in low compared with the current spot rate. The oil company gets 
something back from such renegotiations in the form of increased incentives in the contract.  
The controllability principle is fundamental to incentive design. If they are to hit their target, 
incentives must be tied directly to quantities which the contractor can influence. Given the large 
number of players who contribute to a drilling operation - often 40 different suppliers/contractors - 
it goes without saying that establishing precise incentives in this area is particularly difficult. With 
the target cost contracts described above, however, the main contractor is said to be able to 
influence 70-80 per cent of the parameters. This proportion will undoubtedly vary from field to 
field. The controllability principle makes it difficult in any event to tie incentives to more 
overarching parameters such as production
11. Viewed from the contractor s perspective, this would 
have required increased expertise in reservoir understanding, a strong commitment to and 
expertise in risk management, and opportunities for follow-up and control during the production 
phase. Accepting this type of risk is out of the question for most oil service companies. Their 
strategy is to be industrial enterprises, not oil companies. This represents a problem for new small 
oil companies on the NCS who need a higher degree of risk sharing and also could benefit from 
more technical assistance.  
4.2 Experience so far  
Hydro reported that it was very satisfied with the new contracts. They are estimated to have 
yielded savings of NOK 100 million, of which NOK 30 million has gone to the contractors. Few 
change orders have been made so far and administrative costs are low.  
The oil company retains flexibility in the sense that it can always reduce the drilling target. To 
increase the target, however, negotiations are necessary with the contractor. Earlier, conditions 
could arise where the contractor suffered maximum penalties at an early stage in a well - in other 
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words, all incentive effect was eliminated for the rest of the well. This is avoided with a section-
based incentive system.  
Incentives are said to be positive for the following three reasons: 
1.  ensure continuous focus by the contractor 
2.  strengthen incentives for the contractor to enhance the efficiency of the operation through 
support from its land organisation, including making better use of the data and expertise already in 
its possession 
3.  influence allocation by contractors between different oil companies, with bonus systems 
ensuring that the oil company is allocated good equipment and able people.  
It should be emphasised here that item 3 can primarily be a distribution issue. From a socio-
economic perspective, securing better resources at the expense of another operator on the NCS is 
virtually a zero-sum game. The exception would be if the resources are reallocated to a 
substantially more efficient and competent oil company or to more prospective fields.  
Compensation formats have been subject to somewhat greater decentralisation in Statoil, and 
have varied between different projects and licences. A number of licences were opposed to 
additional incentives, maintaining that the contractors should do a good job for the high level of 
remuneration they are already receiving. Some contracts incorporated additional incentives. These 
were introduced from 2001, and before contracts were signed. It is our understanding that they 
emerged during negotiations with the contractor, but it was unclear whether they were specified in 
the actual invitation to tender. These incentives provided a substantial bonus for drilling contractor 
if it achieved a predetermined number of metres drilled per run. It then received a 50 per cent 
mark-up on the equipment hire. Remuneration for crew was fixed. The incentive scheme 
reportedly worked as intended, with savings in scarce rig time. This was seen by those involved as 
a natural development, whereby the whole industry would eventually be managed by key 
performance indicators (KPIs). On the other hand, Statoil did not adopt incentives tied to a 
specified time per section. Possible reasons cited for this were problems with specifying the 
incentives in advance and that it could put too much pressure on time. Incentive payments 
accounted for a very small proportion of overall rig costs.  
A supplementary effect of incentives was that they contributed to the selection process, in that 
they revealed which companies had faith in their own hardware and personnel - those who wanted 
incentives. However, experienced contract specialists object here that experience shows that all 
contractors want incentives since they know that altered conditions, change orders and so forth 
would mean that the bonuses must be paid regardless.  
Where evaluation of compensation formats for drilling in Hydro and Statoil is concerned, 
experienced contract personnel add that it is usually difficult to assess the effects of incentive 
schemes. The danger is that the questions asked define the answers obtained. If an oil company  
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pays a bonus, it will always claim that this was because it saved money and time or achieved better 
quality. However, the fact is that the pay-out could have been wasted money. Contractor 
performance might have been the same or better without the bonus. That is normally never 
clarified.  
5. Analogy: prospective payment in the hospital sector  
A good deal can often be learnt about financial management by studying other sectors. Proposals 
for helping to overcome resource crises in health services include the introduction of more market-
based systems. The Norwegian health system, for instance, has converted from day rates (the 
treatment day system) to piece rates (prospective payment).This was prompted by the belief that 
day rates encouraged long hospital stays and provided insufficient incentives for efficiency.  
Under the present prospective payment system, a health institution is paid for a specific 
service (such as an operation). This is classified in accordance with the degree of treatment 
involved (DRG weight). The institution itself is responsible for this classification, which obviously 
provides opportunities for strategic adaptation. This represents a classic principal-agent problem, 
where the principal buys a service from an agent which is in possession of private information 
about its product. The problem with strategic reporting is also implicitly recognised in the 
classification regulations, which prohibit an annual growth of more than two per cent in treatment 
weight.  
An allied problem is that health institutions may wish to attract patients with the most 
favourable conditions under the prevailing incentive system, and may seek to reject more difficult 
or less profitable patients. Similarly, the commitment to patient groups not fully covered by the 
prevailing prospective payment system - such as the chronic sick - may be reduced. Particular 
problems have been highlighted in psychiatric treatment. Psychiatric hospitals are largely excluded 
from prospective payment trials, and appropriate incentive schemes for those who treat this type of 
patient need to be assessed.  
Another obvious weakness of the present financing system - a combination of block grants 
and prospective payments - is that transfers are volume-based and contain no quality indicators. It 
is possible that this problem is met through a high level of professional ethics. As the prospective 
payment system becomes better established, we will see what adjustments the various players 
make. Quality measurements should occupy a key place when evaluating this pricing system. A 
hospital is paid per operation at a certain level of difficulty, for instance, and will accordingly have 
an incentive to reduce admission time. That is also the intention. But admission time can be 
reduced to a point where the probability of re-admission rises. An attempt is made to counter this 
by making the payment for re-admission lower than for the initial admission. This is a matter for  
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concern in so far as it is an unintended consequence of the incentive system. Another problem 
posed by rewarding volume is that other quality dimensions - such as the nursing care function - 
may be weakened.  
It is probably too early to judge the prospective payment system for the hospital sector, but 
some preliminary conclusions seem clear. Efficiency has improved, with more patients being 
treated. But this has been constrained by the failure of budgets to increase at the same pace. That 
has raised questions related to quality. There have also been a number of cases of strategic 
reporting, which have been countered by a more detailed control system with not insignificant 
transaction costs. As in drilling, the problem is that the various cases are not comparable. An 
operation can require varying levels of care depending on other conditions from which the patient 
may be suffering. A complex system of diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) has accordingly been 
developed, which needs continuous updating. This all adds up to substantial challenges for the 
system, but it is generally agreed to have provided a necessary efficiency improvement in the 
sector and nobody wishes to return to the treatment day system.  
A number of parallels can be drawn here with drilling, including the quality aspect. 
Maintaining a high pace in oil and gas drilling can increase the probability of losing the drill 
string, for example, which is not very different from a re-admission. However, information and 
control problems are probably rather smaller in the oil sector - in part because the oil company has 
its own personnel on the rig. It is otherwise the case that hospitals are faced with a genuine 
incentive contract - in other words, prospective payments have been introduced and the traditional 
block grants reduced. The prospective payment system is also known in advance - it has not been 
introduced in the middle of the budget period as an addition to other payments.   
6. Specific issues related to incentive design  
Drilling contractors want to see separate bonus schemes for each well section. This gives them and 
their employees a direct and immediate reward for their own commitment, which is said to provide 
stronger incentives than rewards which lie further off in time. The justification for this could partly 
lie in Norway s offshore working time arrangements, whereby personnel spend two weeks on the 
rig and have four weeks off. Contractors must operate with three tours, in other words, and 
section-based bonus systems could ensure that pay-outs are made to a greater extent to the 
individual tour. However, this assumes that the drilling contractor applies the same incentives in-
house that it receives from the principal.  
Section-based incentives are rather more complicated for the oil company. Incentives are used 
to achieve congruence of goals. On the one hand, the company wants efficiency in each section. 
When all is said and done, however, what counts is the final result. Circumstances can arise here  
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where the drilling contractor is rewarded for individual sections, but the well as a whole fails to 
reach specified goals. This means that goals are not congruent at an overall level, while 
performance-based incentives are provided at micro level. That represents a fairly widespread 
trade-off in incentive design. It attracts perhaps the greatest attention in incentive schemes for 
executives. Performance-based incentives for someone who heads a company or one of its 
departments or business areas will be tied to results achieved in relation to a normalised sales price 
- such as a given oil price. Executives cannot influence the price of oil, and the effects of price 
fluctuations should therefore be eliminated from a performance target which can trigger incentive 
payments. If price trends are negative, however, that could mean high pay-outs at a time when the 
company is doing badly. This can conflict with the company s ability to pay and result in 
payments which are difficult to communicate and defend. Alternatively, if remuneration is tied to 
the spot price, executives can receive a high pay-out because of rising product prices despite a 
poor performance with factors which they are actually able to influence directly. This does not 
create problems for the ability to pay, but yields weaker incentives and should really be just as 
hard to communicate.  
Theory does not appear to offer a straightforward answer to the specific case of section-based 
incentives. If rewards are paid only at well level, which embraces three-four offshore tours, no 
clear connection is achieved between the job done by each tour and the reward. Challenges are 
also presented by the free rider problem
12. Section-based incentives are good in the sense that they 
accord with the controllability principle and avoid free riders. On the other hand, they open for 
sub-optimisation in that the individual rig tour may have incentives to maximise the tempo in its 
section even when this is at the expense of progress in others. A normal solution in such contexts 
is that micro-incentives (section-based bonuses) are supplemented by incentives at the next level 
in the value chain, which in this case is overall drilling time for the well.  
Success often carries the seeds of failure for incentive schemes. When a contractor is doing 
really well and generating big profits for its principal, the contract is often amended at the next 
crossroads (or renegotiated in the event of a long-term agreement). This does not seem logical, but 
that is the way things are. The point is that the customer believes the bonus being paid to the 
contractor is too high, and demands a less generous agreement. At the same time, this undermines 
the whole basis for the incentive scheme. That can sometimes be justified, because some 
productivity improvement is to be expected over time. On other occasions, it represents an 
unfavourable change in the rules of the game from the contractor s perspective. In the literature on 
incentives, such tightening of incentive schemes in repeat orders (repeated negotiation game) is 
                    
 
12 Since a particular tour can receive a bonus if the other tours work well, the incentives are weaker than if the bonus 
were tied directly to results for each tour. Even in the latter case, the free rider problem will exist at the individual 
level but can normally be handled by social sanctions in small and transparent groups.  
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called the ratchet effect. The problem is usually that the customer cannot credibly commit to leave 
the contract unchanged over time. A thoughtful contractor will foresee this, which in practice also 
weakens the incentives in the short term - improved productivity is penalised in the next contract. 
Several examples of the ratchet effect can be found in the drilling and oil service sector, such as 
contracts which relate payment to drilling speed. A possible way of reducing this problem is to 
agree on productivity improvements in advance.  
7. Hierarchic incentive systems  
For incentives to function, they must reach the people who take the decisions and do the work. It is 
accordingly important that incentives designed by the oil company for the rig contractor also 
benefit the individual worker to some extent. This is not by any means a matter of course. One 
question will be which people it is important to reach with incentive terms. Allocation of 
equipment may perhaps be done centrally by the contractor, but operational aspects are 
decentralised. Incentives must accordingly have a wide reach in the contractor organisation if they 
are to achieve any effect.  
We have found oil companies who operate reward systems which involve a direct 
contribution to social welfare funds for rig workers in the event of a good result. In other words, 
they act outside the hierarchical system. This ensures that the funds reach their intended target, and 
the sums involved are not large (however, field-specific welfare arrangements can create problems 
for contractors because substantial differences can arise in such provision between workers on 
different rigs). One form of incentive does not exclude others. On the contrary, they should 
complement each other so that suitable incentives are available at every level.  
Modes of operation on the NCS call for close integration between the parties involved. This 
creates two seemingly irreconcilable goals for the reward system: 
a.  an incentive structure which ensures goal alignment, in other words, a remuneration system 
where the contractors participate in gains made collectively - favours bonus schemes 
b.  flexible remuneration structures, which are easy to modify along the way - favours cost-plus 
solutions.  
When an oil company and its contractors work together closely, as with the operation of oil 
and gas fields, it is important to ensure that everyone pulls in the same direction. Only when goals 
are aligned can the full benefit of close collaboration be obtained. This is normally done through 
the use of incentives. Ideally, these are higher-order schemes - in other words, not related simply 
to costs in a specific delivery but taking account of the income side (including flexibility of use 
and quality) and life-cycle costs (for operation and maintenance). Incentives will normally relate to 
specific goals (delivery requirements, productivity and milestones), and will be based on a set of  
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assumptions. The latter normally include the provision of agreed documentation by the oil 
company (drilling plan, rock data and so forth) by a specified deadline. In other words, incentive 
systems require a certain degree of predictability.  
One advantage of close integration between contractor and buyer is flexibility. This is 
particularly important for drilling, especially in the reservoir. New information from the formation 
will often make it desirable to adjust the original plan in order to achieve optimum drainage. The 
financial importance of such changes can far outweigh other considerations, including a desire to 
minimise drilling costs. An oil company s desire for control and flexibility is accordingly at odds 
with the goal of designing incentive systems which can be calculated in advance. The simplest 
way of achieving flexibility is through various forms of cost-plus payments, such as day rates. If 
performance-based incentive systems are to be used, the goals must be adjusted when the oil 
company modifies the original drilling plan. That weakens the incentive system, since the contract 
is not proof against renegotiation. Incomplete contract elements can also have the effect that the 
contractor receives the bonus regardless, since it can always blame a failure to reach the target on 
changes by or deficient deliveries from the oil company. In addition, renegotiation imposes direct 
transaction costs.  
8. Other contract clauses  
The impression given by incentive contracts in use within the oil service sector is that they are 
relatively easy and non-bureaucratic to administer. If changes occur in the basis for calculating 
applicable benchmarks, the latter will not be adjusted. Once a contract has been awarded, it is 
complied with. However, it can have consequences for future productivity requirements. The 
advantages of complying with the contract without renegotiation are predictability and savings in 
transaction costs, while the drawback is that conditions could arise which might be perceived as 
unjust by one of the parties. If incentives are provided for each drilling section, however, this 
sense of injustice will be less significant. With an overall incentive scheme for the whole drilling 
operation, on the other hand, lack of renegotiation could give rise to circumstances in which the 
contractor fails to receive a bonus even if a good job has been done.  
Benefits offered by incentives must be balanced against transaction and renegotiation costs. 
The expense of conducting renegotiations has the implication that the target cost model is little 
used in development contracts. However, our impression is that transaction costs of renegotiation 
are lower in drilling.  
Can contractors be tempted into providing their best personnel and hardware to licences 
which introduce additional incentives? This is reportedly not a genuine problem for the biggest 
customers, where the desire for further contracts has a disciplinary effect. In any event, the  
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contracts specify job categories but normally not individuals. The contractor accordingly has some 
flexibility in allocating resources between different contracts. The exception is key personnel, who 
are specified by name and have their CVs attached. Replacement of personnel is also subject to 
approval by the operator.  
The oil service contracts contain escalation clauses. These have failed to take sufficient 
account of the sharp rise in steel prices, so renegotiations have occurred. The policy at a number of 
oil companies has otherwise been to display caution about changing the compensation format in 
the middle of a contract period. This is because it would be unfair to the other bidders if the basis 
for awarding the contract were to be changed. Had other contractors been aware that changes 
could be made to the compensation design, they might have submitted different bids - in other 
words, changes to compensation could violate equal treatment and an orderly procurement 
process. Credibility with other bidders is important for complying with the regulations and for 
ensuring sufficient competition in future bidding rounds. On the other hand, the companies are 
commercially oriented and open to win-win positions - within the framework of long-term 
contracts, too. Examples are the use of new equipment. However, companies are reluctant to 
change compensation format along the way because losing bidders would be critical. It can be 
added here that such a policy - if credible - also saves the operator from much unnecessary 
negotiating noise.  
Statoil and Hydro (now StatoilHydro) have used the model contracts developed by the 
Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF) for oil service deliveries. The main contract follows 
the model format. However, appendices A (job description) and B (the compensation format, 
which we are analysing) are project-specific and unregulated.   
Conclusion  
Combined with a substantial increase in contract length, scarcity of rigs has prompted a number of 
interesting changes in contractual patterns for drilling on the NCS, e.g., new incentive elements 
have been incorporated in oil service contracts. It is not obvious that all these development trends 
will survive a downturn in the market for oil services, but they nevertheless represent interesting 
experiments in alternative contractual and organisational patterns. Paradoxically, a trend towards 
reduced pressure in the rig industry could also lead to further testing on the contract side since oil 
service companies could then feel under pressure to accept more risk. Most genuine incentive 
systems require a certain amount of risk to be borne by the contractors. In conditions where lower 
rates prevail, however, contractors will be less able to bear this type of risk. It is accordingly  
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unfortunate that they have not been more active in trying out alternative compensation principles 
during the present boom.  
Oil service companies must be challenged to design contracts which are suitable for new 
small companies on the NCS. These will require a different approach to risk sharing than existing 
agreements. Today s contracts reflect the fact that players on the NCS have been large 
international companies with high risk tolerance and great expertise in managing drilling 
operations. This does not apply for many of the new companies on the NCS, which will want to 
pass more risk over to contractors and which are much more dependent on purchasing external 
expertise. To satisfy this demand, contractors must expand their expertise base and develop 
suitable risk management systems. However, risk exposure must be carefully matched at all times 
to the ability of the contractors to bear it. Research shows that turnkey contracts are primarily 
utilised for exploration wells drilled from jack-up rigs in shallow waters, and that the oil 
companies using such agreements are small enterprises with limited experience and financial 
strength. Exploration wells in the North Sea should fit this description for some of the new 
companies on the NCS. Well intervention is another possible example. However, establishing such 
contracts requires that oil service companies exist which are willing to bear the increased risk and 
to expand the range and scope of their services. Few signs exist that this is the case with today s 
contractors, in part because a clear distinction exists between drilling and oil service providers and 
because none of these appear willing to bear reservoir and oil price risk. But intermediate solutions 
can be conceived, without a single turnkey contractor for drilling but at any rate with fewer 
providers because one oil service company covers a wider range of activities. That would simplify 
procurement and management processes for the oil company. It would also open the way to 
increased use of incentive contracts, since contractors providing more services acquire greater 
control over the drilling process. The collaboration between Pertra and Halliburton indicates that 
increased value creation could be provided by procurement models of this type. A development in 
the direction of integrated deliveries should also be interesting for the international oil companies, 
since the benefits - better coordination and reduced transaction costs - appear comparable with the 
integration on the supplier side we have seen in development projects following the introduction of 
engineering, procurement, construction and installation (EPCI) contracts. However, the advantages 
of greater integration among contractors must be weighed against the drawback of reduced 
competition - in practice, few companies can offer such a wide range of services.  
The authorities and the industry have a common interest in reversing the negative trend in 
drilling efficiency on the NCS. Should this reduction result in the loss of resources which might 
otherwise have been recovered profitably, it would also be a matter of concern from a socio-
economic perspective. However, rapid drilling is not always compatible with good reservoir 
utilisation and efficient information gathering, so a trade-off must be made here. Section-based  
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drilling incentives, where work in the actual reservoir can be treated specially, seem suitable for 
making such a trade-off. Strong speed incentives can then be provided for pure transport stages, 
followed by detailed control when drilling in the actual reservoir. The interests of oil companies 
with a fairly long planning horizon will partly coincide with those of the government where 
reservoir utilisation is concerned. However, conditions could clearly arise - through pressure on 
liquidity, for instance, or on reaching specific indicators - where the authorities ought to keep a 
close watch on reservoir utilisation.  
Developments on the contract side must be harmonised with technological trends, which are 
moving in the direction of measurement while drilling. This permits the immediate transfer of 
information about the geological structure to the rig crew and, via the broadband network, to the 
oil company and the land-based support personnel at the contractor. That opens the way to 
continuous optimisation of the drilling process. A drilling regime of this kind clearly requires a 
flexible contractual structure which permits changes along the way. That could impose restrictions 
on certain types of incentive systems in the reservoir phase of production wells.  
Rising costs in the oil industry represent a substantial problem. Decentralised contractual 
structures could mean sub-optimisation in this area. The optimum solution at project level could be 
very strong incentives (competitive rates), but this might help to drive up costs for the NCS as a 
whole. A trade-off will consequently exist on the NCS between welfare effects in new forms of 
contract, where possible efficiency gains from increased incentives must be weighed against a 
higher level of costs. While major oil companies will internalise much of the growth in costs, and 
thereby share virtually identical interests with the authorities, enterprises with small portfolios on 
the NCS will primarily emphasises incentive considerations. Additional incentives in oil service 
contracts are reported to be profitable for the individual licence. To evaluate profitability at the 
level of the continental shelf, however, account must also be taken of possible knock-on effects in 
the form of increased rates in competing licences. However, additional incentives represent such 
small sums that they are not a substantial problem. On the other hand, innovative thinking should 
be welcomed in a contract area which has been conservative.  
The oil companies must be challenged to give weight to technical and organisational quality 
when awarding contracts, including technical performance in excess of specifications, in order to 
provide incentives for the development of new technology and solutions.   
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